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The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Why




The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) is federal
legislation aimed at protecting the legal rights of individuals
serving in the United States armed forces.' The Act's stated
purpose is "to provide for the temporary suspension of judicial and
administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely
affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military
service"2 in order "to enable such persons to devote their entire
energy to the defense needs of the Nation."3 One way the SCRA
accomplishes this purpose is by allowing courts to stay proceedings
involving servicemembers 4 whose military service materially
affects their ability to participate in the process.5 Despite its good
intentions, the SCRA has proved problematic when it comes to
child custody hearings, because the granting of a stay suspends
either the case or some designated proceeding(s) within it.6
Most states have a policy of providing for the best interests of
t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota; B.A. 2005, University of
Michigan. The publication of this article would not have been possible without the
staff and editors of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice. The
author wishes to thank Professor Marvin Krislov for inspiring her to become a
better writer, and her friends and family for their encouragement, love, and
support.
1. See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 501-96 (West
2003).
2. Id. § 502(2).
3. Id. § 502(1).
4. See Mark E. Sullivan, Child Custody, OFFICER (Reserve Officer's Assoc. of
U.S., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1, 2006, at 56 (stating that a stay suspends "all or part of a
civil case when one of the parties' military duties hinders his or her ability to
respond in court").
5. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522(b) (West 2004) (amended 2008).
6. See Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Ark. 2004) (citing State
Game & Fish Comm'n v. Sledge, 42 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Ark. 2001) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990))) (stating that a stay "is a kind of injunction
with which a court freezes its proceedings at a particular point" and that it "can be
used to stop the prosecution of the action altogether, or to hold up only some phase
of it").
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the child 7 when it comes to custody decisions. s Reconciling the
SCRA with state law, however, has produced a tremendous debate
over which interests should take precedence: those of the child or
those of the servicemember. Oregon Circuit Court Judge Dale
Koch, who is also former President of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, commented that as a judge,
"[y]ou don't want to penalize a parent because they've [sic] served
their country. On the other hand.., you don't want to penalize
the child." 9 Family court judges often feel "a continuing obligation
to consider what's in the best interest of the child," even though
many of these considerations directly conflict with military
service.' 0 As a result, servicemember parents have lost custody of
their children because they answered our nation's call to duty."
This Article argues that the current version of the SCRA
inadequately protects the legal rights of servicemembers who are
involved in child custody disputes during their military service
and consequently should be amended to better protect these
servicemembers' rights. Part I discusses the history of the SCRA,
specifically detailing the challenges courts face when a parent is
fighting for the United States and is thus unavailable to attend a
custody proceeding. Part II examines the application of the SCRA
to child custody proceedings involving servicemembers and the
SCRA's incompatibility with the best interests of the child. Part
III looks at what has been done to address these problems and
whether it has been enough. Finally, Part IV proposes a uniform
federal law that takes into account both the best interests of the
child and the custodial expectations of parents who are
7. One law dictionary defines the "best interests of the child" as:
A standard by which a court determines what arrangements would be
to a child's greatest benefit, often used in deciding child-custody and
visitation matters and in deciding whether to approve an adoption or a
guardianship. A court may use many factors, including the emotional
tie between the child and the parent or guardian, the ability of a
parent or guardian to give the child love and guidance, the ability of a
parent or guardian to provide necessaries, the established living
arrangement between a parent or guardian and the child, the child's
preference if the child is old enough that the court will consider that
preference in making a custody award, and a parent's ability to foster
a healthy relationship between the child and the other parent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children's Rights and the Need for Protection,
34 FAM. L.Q. 421, 426 (2000).
9. Pauline Arrillaga, Soldier-Parents Fight on 2 Fronts, Deployed GIs Lose
Child Custody, and a Federal Law is of Little Help, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, May




SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
servicemembers.
I. Background
A. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
1. History of the Act
When a citizen leaves home to serve in the armed forces, the
servicemember and his or her family may encounter tremendous
financial and personal hardships, such as repossessions, decreased
income, and indebtedness. As one scholar argues:
[E]ven when military service does not cause economic
hardship, a servicemember's geographic distance from home
may make it hard for him or her to respond to legal problems
as they arise .... Servicemembers in remote or hostile
locations may find it difficult to communicate with, let alone
retain, legal counsel to represent them. 12
Historically, "Congress, state legislatures, and the courts have
recognized the need to protect servicemembers who are unable to
defend their legal rights because of their military service."'13 For
example, during the Civil War, several states enacted moratoria
"barring enforcement of plaintiffs' rights against
servicemembers." 14
After the Civil War, Congress passed the Act of June 11,
1864,15 which "suspended any action, civil or criminal, against
federal soldiers or sailors while they were in the service of the
Union and made them immune from service of process or arrest."'
16
Unfortunately, this absolute ban on suits against servicemembers
had many unintended consequences. 17 As a result, Congress
enacted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19181s after
12. Mark S. Cohen, Entitlement To a Stay or Default Judgment Relief Under




15. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 501 (1988)).
16. Amy J. McDonough et al., Crisis of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act: A Call for the Ghost of Major (Professor) John Wigmore, 43 MERCER L. REV.
667, 669 (1992) (footnote omitted).
17. See Mary Kathleen Day, Material Effect: Shifting the Burden of Proof for
Greater Procedural Relief Under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 27
TULSA L.J. 45, 46 (1991) (noting that this legislation "prevented creditors from
filing lawsuits against servicemembers for the duration of their military service,"
thus creditors often refused to extend credit to servicemembers or their families).
18. Act of Mar. 8, 1918, ch. 20, 40 Stat. 440.
2009]
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entering World War 1. 19 This Act "gave trial courts discretion to
grant relief when a litigant's military status would materially
affect the servicemember's ability to protect his or her legal rights
or comply with the obligation in question. '20 When the United
States entered World War II, this Act was updated and renamed
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA).21
Unfortunately, except for very minor amendments, 22 the SSCRA
remained essentially unchanged until 2003 when the United
States invaded Iraq, and Congress amended and recodified the
SSCRA as the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. 23 "The SCRA...
updates the language of the [SSCRA] to remove archaic
terminology and to reflect the modern military, including the
service of women. ' 24 Additionally, the SCRA clarifies and expands
the protections for servicemembers who cannot appear at judicial
hearings. 25 Unlike under the SSCRA, where it was left to the trial
court's discretion whether to grant "a stay on the ground that a
party is absent in the military service and that his absence will
materially affect his prosecution or defense of the action, ' 26 under
the SCRA "[a] stay of proceedings is mandatory upon a properly
supported application by the servicemember, but not so if the
19. Cohen, supra note 12, at 333; see also In re Watson, 292 B.R. 441, 444
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (stating that the SSCRA of 1918 "was created in order to
protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs and take up the
burden of the nation") (citations omitted).
20. Cohen, supra note 12, at 333.
21. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (current version at 50 U.S.C.A.
app. §§ 501-96 (West 2003)).
22. Some additions and modifications were made to the SSCRA following the
Persian Gulf War. See e.g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-12, 105 Stat. 34 (amending "to improve and clarify the
protections provided by" the SSCRA); James P. Pottorff, Jr., The Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act: A Modern Replacement for the SSCRA, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Oct. 2005,
at 20, 20-21 (noting that from 1991 to 1992 representatives from the Judge
Advocate Generals met "with staffers from the House Committee on Veterans'
Affairs to identify and propose changes to the SSCRA," which resulted in "a draft
restatement of the SSCRA").
23. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 501-96 (West 2003); see H.R. REP. No. 108-81, at 32
(2003), reprinted in In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(stating that due to the hundreds of thousands of servicemembers fighting in the
war on terrorism and the war in Iraq, "the Committee believes the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) should be restated and strengthened to ensure
that its protections meet their needs in the 21st century").
24. Pottorff, supra note 22, at 21.
25. See e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 512(b) (West 2003) (stating that "[tihis Act
[sections 501 to 596 of this Appendix] applies to any judicial or administrative
proceeding commenced in any court or agency in any jurisdiction subject to this Act
[said sections]. This Act [said sections] does not apply to criminal proceedings.").
26. Martin v. Wagner, 25 So.2d 409, 411 (Ala. 1946) (citing Boone v. Lightner,
319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).
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statutory conditions are not met. '27 Furthermore, the SCRA now
affords protection to Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard servicemembers, including active-duty members,
reservists, and National Guard members called to active duty. 28
Even with all of these changes, however, the SCRA's broad
purpose remains the same as that of its predecessors: to enable
servicemembers to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs
of the Nation. ' '29
2. Legal Standard for Granting a Stay Pursuant to
the SCRA
Even though the SCRA allows courts to stay civil proceedings
involving certain categories of servicemembers, in order for a stay
to be granted a servicemember must do more than merely tell the
court that he or she has been called to active duty. Rather, in
order for a court to grant his or her stay request, the
servicemember must prove that his or her current military duties
materially affect his or her ability to appear.
Pursuant to the SCRA § 522(b)(1):
At any stage before final judgment in a civil action or
proceeding in which a servicemember described in subsection
(a) is a party, 30 the court may on its own motion and shall,
upon application by the servicemember, stay the action for a
period of not less than 90 days, if the conditions in paragraph
(2) are met.3 1
Section 522(b)(2) of the SCRA states:
An application for a stay under paragraph (1) shall include the
27. In re Marriage of Bradley, 137 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Kan. 2006).
28. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 511(1) (West 2004) ("The term 'servicemember'
means a member of the uniformed services, as that term is defined in section
101(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code.").
29. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 502(1) (West 2003); see id. § 502. According to the
statute:
The purposes of this Act [sections 501 to 596 of this Appendix] are-(1)
to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense through
protection extended by this Act [said sections] to servicemembers of
the United States to enable such persons to devote their entire energy
to the defense needs of the Nation; and (2) to provide for the
temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and
transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of
servicemembers during their military service.
Id.
30. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522(a) (West 2004) (amended 2008) (stating that the
"section applies to any civil action or proceeding [where a party] at the time of filing
an application under this section-(1) is in military service or is within 90 days
after termination of or release from military service; and (2) has received notice of
the action or proceeding").




(A) A letter or other communication setting forth facts stating
the manner in which current military duty requirements
materially affect the servicemember's ability to appear and
stating a date when the servicemember will be available to
appear.
(B) A letter or other communication from the servicemember's
commanding officer stating that the servicemember's current
military duty prevents appearance and that military leave is
not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the
letter. 32
The structure of section 522(b)(2) indicates that even if a
servicemember proves to the court that his or her current military
duties materially affect his or her ability to appear, the
servicemember still must include a communication from his or her
commanding officer stating the aforementioned and that he or she
is not authorized for military leave.33 A stay under the SCRA is
only mandatory if the servicemember fulfills both of these
requirements. 34
3. The Judiciary's Interpretation of the Legal
Standard for Granting a Stay Under the SCRA
Levi Bradley was serving with the military in Iraq when his
ex-wife, Amber Bradley, filed a motion seeking to modify the
current temporary custody order which granted sole legal custody
of their son to Levi and physical custody of their son to Levi's
mother. 35 Levi responded by requesting that the court stay the
proceeding, pursuant to the SCRA, until he was available to
testify.36 The court decided, however, that Levi did not properly
apply for a stay.37  Consequently, the court granted Amber's
motion for temporary physical custody, which later became
permanent. 38 In Bradley, the court interpreted the language of
SCRA § 522(b)(1) to mean "that a court's discretion to grant a stay
on its own motion depends on satisfaction of the statutory
conditions." 39 As a result, the court held that "where there is a
32. Id. § 522(b)(2).
33. See In re Marriage of Bradley, 137 P.3d 1030, 1033 (Kan. 2006).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1032.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1034.
38. Arrillaga, supra note 9, at A8.
39. Bradley, 137 P.3d at 1034. The court stated:
The Act expressly provides for a mandatory stay of proceedings on a
servicemember's motion if the motion includes (1) a statement as to
how his current military duties materially affect his ability to appear
216 [Vol. 27:211
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failure to satisfy the conditions of the Act, then the granting of a
stay is within the discretion of the trial court."40  Notably, the
Bradley court also concluded that "[a] stay of proceedings is
mandatory upon a properly supported application by the
servicemember." 41 This burden 42 is placed "on the servicemember
to demonstrate 'material affect' by providing a factual basis for
supporting the stay request." 43  For Levi, who was deployed to
Iraq, this meant that for the court to stay the proceeding, he
needed to provide a statement that his "current military duty
prevents his appearance and [a] statement that he has no military
leave presently authorized." 44 Since the court concluded that Levi
failed to provide either one, it denied his stay request.
45
In determining whether a servicemember's military service
46
has a material effect on his or her ability to participate in an
action, the two factors most often considered "are (1) the
and when he will be available to appear and (2) a statement from his
commanding officer stating that the servicemember's current military
duty prevents his appearance and military leave is not authorized for
him at the time of the statement.
Id. at 1033.
40. Id. at 1034.
41. Id. (indicating that the court did not reach the question of whether the trial
court could have denied the temporary order changing custody if the SCRA's
conditions for a stay had been complied with).
42. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522 (West 2004); H.R. REP. No. 108-81, at 38 (2003)
(stating that the SCRA assigns the burden of production to the servicemember); cf.
Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 570 (1943) (holding that under the SSCRA, the
district court has discretion "as to whom the court may ask to come forward with
facts needful to a fair judgment").
43. In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 03-2100, 2004 WL 2579567, at *4 n.7
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004) (citation omitted), vacated, 698 N.W.2d 140, 146-47
(Iowa 2005).
44. Bradley, 137 P.3d at 1034.
45. Id.
46. The term "military service" means:
(A) in the case of a servicemember who is a member of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard-
(i) active duty, as defined in section 101(d)(1) of title 10, United
States Code, and
(ii) in the case of a member of the National Guard, includes
service under a call to active service authorized by the President
or the Secretary of Defense for a period of more than 30
consecutive days under section 502(0 of title 32, United States
Code, for purposes of responding to a national emergency declared
by the President and supported by Federal funds;
(B) in the case of a servicemember who is a commissioned officer of the
Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, active service; and
(C) any period during which a servicemember is absent from duty on
account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful cause.
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 511(2) (West 2004).
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servicemember's availability, and (2) the necessity of the
servicemember's presence." 47 Even if a litigant is "on active duty
and stationed at a base in a foreign country[, d]epending upon
whether the soldier has available leave time, and the option of
using the said leave time, the Court may find that the litigant's
military service is not materially affecting his or her ability to
proceed." 48
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
"[t]he SCRA is to be 'liberally construed to protect those who have
been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the
nation."' 49 In Le Maistre v. Leffers,50 the court declared that "the
Act [SSCRA] must be read with an eye friendly to those who
dropped their affairs to answer their country's call." 51
Additionally, the SCRA "is to be administered as an instrument to
accomplish substantial justice," even though this "may result in
detriment to parties who are not in the military service," 52 as
"[o]ur country's servicemembers must have peace of mind that
they will not be subject to civil actions which they cannot appear
and defend."5 3
B. Parental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child
Doctrine
1. Family Care Plans
The Army requires soldiers who are "single parents or who
have a spouse in the military to complete a 'family care plan' that
will provide for children during the soldier's deployment." 54 As
part of a family care plan, a parent must resolve guardianship of
his or her children while on active duty.55 Although a JAG officer
47. Cohen, supra note 12, at 346.
48. Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *3 (N.Y. Fain.
Ct. May 21, 2004) (citation omitted).
49. Reed v. Albaaj, 723 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Boone v.
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).
50. Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1 (1948).
51. Id. at 6 (citing Boone, 319 U.S. at 575) (discussing the SSCRA).
52. In re Watson, 292 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (citations omitted);
cf. Slove v. Strohm, 236 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (stating that the Act
"may not be used as a sword against persons with legitimate claims against
servicemen. Some balancing between the rights of the respective parties must be
arrived at.").
53. In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
54. Darrell Baughn, Divorce & Deployment: Representing the Military
Servicemember, 28 FAM. ADVOc. 8, 8 (2005) (citing U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 600-20,
Army Command Policy 5-5 (May 13, 2002)).
55. See id. at 8 (stating that the "family care plan provides proof to the Army
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can "draft a special power of attorney for temporary guardianship,
thereby granting another family member or qualified person
guardianship of the child or children,"56 this is not a legal
guardianship. 57
Wilton Lebo, a member of the Louisiana National Guard, was
called to active duty effective July 10, 2003. 58 Prior to being
deployed to Afghanistan, Mr. Lebo, who was the domiciliary
parent, "executed a power of attorney naming his current wife, Lee
Anna Lebo, as guardian of the child and giving her authority to act
on the child's behalf."5 9 However, when Mrs. Farlow, Mr. Lebo's
ex-wife, found out that Mr. Lebo was deployed, she refused to
return the child to Mrs. Lebo and petitioned the court for
temporary custody.60 In response, the court denied Mrs. Farlow's
petition and granted Mrs. Lebo's civil warrant for the child's
return.61 On appeal, the court stated that according to Louisiana
law,62 "Mr. Lebo was acting within his authority in leaving his
child in the care of his current wife." 63 The court noted, however,
that Louisiana law "does not authorize a domiciliary parent to
unilaterally change custody of a minor child as Mr. Lebo
apparently attempted to do in his power of attorney." 64
that the solider has made financial provisions for dependents, that the soldier has
thoroughly briefed guardians on their responsibilities, and that guardians can
access all military benefits available to the dependent").
56. Id. at 9.
57. The military power of attorney form specifically provides:
"You must understand that a POA will not prevent another person,
such as a non-custodial parent or relative of your child (ren) [sic], from
petitioning a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain temporary or
permanent custody of your children." It also provides, "You must also
understand that depending on the law or other requirements where
your child (ren) will be living, a POA may not always be effective for
your designated guardian to care for your child (ren) [sic] under any or
all circumstances."
Lebo v. Lebo, 886 So.2d 491, 493 n.1 (La. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting the military
power of attorney form).




62. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B)(3) (1994) (stating that "[tihe domiciliary
parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an
implementation order provides otherwise .... It shall be presumed that all major
decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.").
63. Lebo, 886 So.2d at 492.
64. Id. at 492-93 (stating that the authority to modify a custody order is
reserved to the courts). Accordingly, the court remanded the case, stating that it
was an error for the trial court to deny Mrs. Farlow's petition for temporary
custody without conducting a hearing, but noted that the issue of temporary
custody was likely now moot since Mr. Lebo had already returned from deployment.
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In Tallon v. DaSilva,65 the court decided whether the
servicemember father could use a power of attorney to assign his
custody rights to his parents while he was deployed on active
duty.66 After producing an extensive record, the court concluded
"custody rights are not assignable to third parties, [since t]he best
interests of children in custody disputes are determined not by
unilateral fiat of one parent, but by the courts." 67 Accordingly, the
court held parents may not "use powers of attorney to assign
custody rights to grandparents or others while deployed outside
the Commonwealth on active military service."68 The court based
this conclusion on a slippery slope argument stating "[i]f a parent
is permitted to assign custody rights to a grandparent, there is no
principled reason as a matter of law why he or she could not also
assign these custody rights to any other third party."69
Additionally, the court noted it was not bound by the father's
Military Family Plan, nor by his power of attorney because "[t]o
hold otherwise would effectively provide the United States
Secretary of Defense or his delegees not simply the right to control
the nation's armed forces but also the opportunity to control some
cases in the states' family courts. Our law does not permit such a
result."70
2. Parental Rights
In Troxel v. Granville,71 the United States Supreme Court
held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."72 In
See id. at 494.
65. Tallon v. DaSilva, No. FD02-4291-003 (Ct. Com. P1. Alleghany County
2005), reprinted in 153 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 164 (2005) [hereinafter Tallon].
66. Id. at 165.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 164; cf. Curtis v. Klimowicz, 631 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that even though the father could not take his daughter with him if he was
deployed overseas, he would still retain primary physical custody because his
daughter would remain at home with his current wife, and he would be free to
exercise his custody rights by returning to the U.S. during off-duty periods or upon
completion of his assignment).
69. Tallon, supra note 65, at 165; cf. In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 03-2100,
2004 WL 2579567, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004), vacated, 698 N.W.2d 140,
146-47 (Iowa 2005) (noting that in reality, the Family Care Plan just "steps in for a
soldier; it governs who will exercise the soldier's rights under the decree while the
soldier is on active duty. Thus, Family Care Plans take no rights from the other
party to the decree; they merely exercise the soldier's rights while on active duty.").
70. Tallon, supra note 65, at 165.
71. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
72. Id. at 66.
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New York, a court must first determine that extraordinary
circumstances exist before allowing "a non-parent to challenge the
right of the natural parent to custody of his or her child."73
Similarly, in Iowa, "[c]ourts can modify the custodial terms of a
dissolution decree only when it is established 'by a preponderance
of evidence that conditions since the decree was entered have so
materially and substantially changed that the children's best
interests make it expedient to make the requested change."' 74
Additionally, "[t]he change must be more or less permanent and
relate to the welfare of the children."75
Since the SCRA "is a complete restatement of the law,"76
cases decided under the SSCRA are still applicable to the SCRA77
and "[d]ecisions construing the Act indicate that when a military
parent seeks a stay of a child-custody or visitation proceeding, the
trial judge should consider the impact of such a stay on the other
parent's right to visit and communicate with the children."78 In
Ex parte K.N.L., the mother petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus after the Baldwin Juvenile Court denied her motion to
stay a pendente lite79 child-custody proceeding pursuant to the
SSCRA.8° On appeal, the Alabama court failed "to see how the
juvenile court's refusal to stay a pendente lite custody order could
materially affect the mother's ability to defend her interests at a
final custody hearing after she returns from active duty," and as a
73. Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *4 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. May 21, 2004) (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976)).
74. Grantham, 2004 WL 2579567, at *8 (quoting In re Marriage of Frederici,
338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983)).
75. In re Marriage of Walton, 577 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
76. 149 CONG. REC. H3688 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Rep. Smith).
"A 'restatement' of a law has long been understood to mean a law that has been
updated, clarified and strengthened, including a gathering of the relevant judicial
interpretations and a measured casting aside of those few interpretations that do
not comport with the author's understanding of the law's intent." Id.
77. Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams, Bankruptcy and Debt Under the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. Part II § 4 (2008).
78. Exparte K.N.L., 872 So.2d 868, 871 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (citation omitted);
see In re Marriage of Rayman, 47 P.3d 413, 416 (Kan. 2002) (refusing to adopt a
'"right line rule that a parent with residential custody of his or her children loses
that custody when required to be away from his or her children for an extended
period of time").
79. See T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So.2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (citing Hodge
v. Steinwinder, 919 So.2d 1179, 1182 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)) ("A pendente lite
custody order is an order that is effective only during the pendency of the litigation
in an existing case and is usually replaced by the entry of a final judgment.").
80. K.N.L., 872 So.2d at 871-72. This case was decided under the SSCRA
because it was final prior to the SCRA's enactment. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 501
(West 2003) (stating that the SCRA applies "to any case that is not final before
[Dec. 19, 2003].").
Law and Inequality
result affirmed the lower court's denial of the stay.8 1
3. Best Interests of the Child Doctrine
In the nineteenth century, the best interests of the child
doctrine emerged to displace absolutist protections of fathers'
rights.8 2  This doctrine has the "underlying assumption that
decisions about children ought to take into account the well-being
of an individual child whose case is under adjudication."8 3
"Treating children with the dignity owed to individual persons
requires an assessment of their needs even if they have no
autonomous views to articulate. This is the core purpose of the
best-interest standard."8 4
In determining the best interests of the child, one scholar
argues:
[T]he court must consider all relevant factors, including: the
wishes of the child's parents; the wishes of the child; the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her
parents, siblings, and other persons who may significantly
affect the child's best interests; the child's adjustment to his or
her home, school, and community; and, the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved. s5
Additionally, in making this determination, "a court must review
the totality of the situation."8 6  If after considering the best
interests of the child, the court determines that "there is no
indication that a change in custody will result in significantly
enhancing a child's welfare, it is generally considered in his best
interest not to disrupt his life."8 7
In Ohio, a court will not modify a prior child custody decree
unless it finds that there has been a change in the circumstances
that makes modification necessary to serve the best interests of
the child. 8 Additionally, the change in circumstances "must be a
change of substance, not a slight or inconsequential change."8 9 In
81. Id.
82. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking about Children's Rights in Judicial
Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105, 117 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 118.
85. George L. Blum, Right of Parent to Regain Custody of Child After
Temporary Conditional Relinquishment of Custody, 6 A.L.R. 6th 229, 241 (2005)
(citing AM. JURIS. 2d Divorce and Separation § 931 [sic]).
86. Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *5 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. May 21, 2004) (citations omitted).
87. Pawelski v. Buchholtz, 459 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (App. Div. 1983) (citations
omitted).
88. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a) (Supp. 2008).
89. Davis v. Flickinger, 674 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ohio 1997).
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Alabama, a parent seeking to modify a previous custody order
bears a heavy burden of proof.90 The parent must prove that a
material change in circumstances has occurred since the prior
judgment, that a change of custody will materially promote the
child's best interest, and that the benefits of the change will "more
than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the
child."91
In New York, when "a non-parent is being considered to take
custody of a child in contravention of the rights of a natural
parent, the [c]ourt must first determine whether extraordinary
circumstances" exist. 92  In one New York case, the father
petitioned the court for physical custody of his child after he
learned that his ex-wife, Tanya Towne, was being called to active
duty in the Army National Guard. 93 Towne acknowledged her
pending deployment and stated that she had already "executed
guardianship papers allowing for her current husband and her
mother to care for the child."94 Towne argued that because of her
deployment, the proceeding should be stayed and her child should
remain with her current husband. 95 The court found, however,
that extraordinary circumstances did not exist that would justify
leaving the child in the custody of a non-parent pending trial, in
derogation of the natural parent's rights. 96  In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated that "[t]he fact that the mother will be
unavailable as a physical custodian for her son due to her military
service is not an extraordinary circumstance with regard to the
father's ability to be the physical custodian of his son."97 As a
result, the court stayed the proceeding but entered a temporary
order transferring the child's physical custody to his father, "the
available natural parent, until such time that the mother is no
longer on active duty in the military or a trial is held on this
matter."9
8
90. See Exparte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863, 866 (Ala. 1984).
91. Id. at 865.
92. Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *4 (N.Y. Fain.
Ct. May 21, 2004) (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976)).
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *2.
96. See id. at *6. The court noted that "if in fact extraordinary circumstances
exist, the Court will then proceed to the analysis of the best interest of the child to
determine custody on that ground." Id. at *4. Furthermore, the court noted that
"in determining what is in the best interest of the child, a court must review the
totality of the situation." Id. at *5.
97. Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at *7.
2009]
Law and Inequality
In In re Marriage of Grantham,99 after the father, Michael,
the primary physical custodian, was called to active duty with the
Iowa National Guard, his ex-wife, Tammara, filed a petition
requesting permanent physical custody of their two children and
temporary custody of the children pendente lite.100 The father
requested that the court stay the child custody proceedings
pursuant to the SSCRA until he was no longer on active duty, but
the court denied the request. 101 Shortly thereafter, the trial court
ruled that the mother should be given permanent physical custody
of the children.10 2 Disagreeing with the appellate court,1 03 the
Iowa Supreme Court stated that "it is not in the interests of an
accurate adjudication of Tammara's request for permanent
custody, or in the best interests of the minor children, to ignore
matters that happened during Michael's absence if those matters
weigh in favor of a change of child custody."'10 4 However, "[a]s a
result of [this] judgment ... a soldier, who answered our Nation's
call to [duty], lost physical care of his children because he was
'obliged to drop [his] own affairs to take up the burdens of the
nation."' 105
C. The Conflict Between the SCRA and State Law
In Tallon v. DaSilva, the court had to decide whether state
custody proceedings are included in the category of civil matters
stayed pursuant to the SCRA.106 After extensive research, the
court concluded that "pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, 107 the stay provision of the SCRA
99. In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2005).
100. Id. at 143.
101. Id. This case was decided under the SSCRA because it was final prior to
the SCRA's enactment. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 501 (West 2003) (stating that the
SCRA applies "to any case that is not final before" December 19, 2003).
102. 698 N.W.2d at 143.
103. See In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 03-2100, 2004 WL 2579567, at *10(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004), vacated, 698 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2005) (stating that
the underlying purpose of the SSCRA was violated when the district court
conducted a hearing based on the mother's petition for modification of child
custody, when the district court's "decision was based upon temporary
circumstances that would not have existed had the proceedings been properly
stayed or had the district court not impermissibly granted temporary change of
physical care").
104. In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d at 144-45.
105. In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 03-2100, 2004 WL 2579567, at *10 (citing
Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).
106. Tallon, supra note 65, at 164.
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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necessarily applies to custody cases."108 However, the court held
that since "a child does not exist in 'suspended animation' during
the pendency of any stay entered pursuant to the SCRA[, t]he
issue of the child's custody during a parent's deployment must
perforce be addressed."10 9  As a result, the court awarded
temporary physical custody of the child to the mother, the non-
deployed parent. 110
Similarly, in Lenser v. McGowan,111 the court had to decide
whether it could enter a temporary custody order if it were to
grant a stay of the divorce proceeding under the SCRA.112 Lenser,
who filed for divorce while on active duty, argued that because the
circuit court stayed the divorce proceeding, it lacked jurisdiction to
issue a temporary custody order.11 3 Accordingly, Lenser stated
that since the child was in his custody when the stay was granted,
the child should remain with him pending trial. 14 However, the
court held that even though the SCRA provides a stay in domestic
relations cases, it does "not prevent the circuit court from entering
a temporary order of custody."1 15 This is because the "relief
afforded against adverse effects may not be used to gain an
advantage, or in other words, may not be used as a sword. The
idea is to relieve servicemembers from disadvantages arising from
military service, not to provide advantages by reason of military
service."1 16 Therefore, the court stated that if it accepted Lenser's
argument, it "would create an environment in which a
servicemember could always gain custody by simply making sure
the child is staying with the servicemember when the stay is
requested. That would provide servicemembers an advantage
rather than protect against adverse affects."11 7
In contrast, in Ratliff v. Ratliff,118 a non-custodial mother
petitioned the court for a custody modification, but the trial court
stayed the proceeding since the child's father was out of the
country serving with the United States military. 1 1 9 On appeal, the
108. Ta~lon, supra note 65, at 165 (citations omitted).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id.
111. Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506 (Ark. 2004).
112. Id. at 509.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 507.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 511.
117. Id.
118. Ratliffv. Ratliff, 15 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1944).
119. Id. at 275.
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Iowa Supreme Court held that the stay was properly granted on
behalf of the soldier father. 20 The court based its conclusion on
the fact that conducting "a hearing on an application to change the
status of the custody of [children] while [a parent] is in military
service, and when he is not in a position to personally be present,
would materially affect his right to properly present his side of the
case . "121
D. Legislation Enacted in Response to this Conflict
1. State Law
Since 2005, at least twelve states have amended their child
custody statutes in an attempt to accommodate both the best
interests of the child and the legal rights of the servicemember
parent. 122 For example, in Michigan, where one of the first such
amendments was enacted, the statute provides:
If a motion for change of custody is filed during the time a
parent is in active military duty, the court shall not enter an
order modifying or amending a previous judgment or order, or
issue a new order, that changes the child's placement that
existed on the date the parent was called to active military
duty, except the court may enter a temporary custody order if
there is clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child. Upon a parent's return from active
military duty, the court shall reinstate the custody order in
effect immediately preceding that period of active military
duty. If a motion for change of custody is filed after a parent
returns from active military duty, the court shall not consider
a parent's absence due to that military duty in a best
interest 12 3 of the child determination. 124
120. Id.
121. Id. at 274; cf. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 501 et
seq., 2007 A.L.R. FED. 2d 6 (2007) (citing Mattmiller v. Kopesky, No. Civ.05-1841
PAMJJG, 2006 WL 980816 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2006), cert. of appealability denied,
No. 05-1841 (PAM/JJG), 2006 WL 1431354 (D. Minn. May 24, 2006) (holding "that
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not preempt state law regarding the
determination of domicile or residency for purposes of a tax evasion action")).
122. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.27 (Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-09-06.6(9) (Supp. 2007).
123. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 722.23 (West 2002). According to the law:
As used in this act, "best interests of the child" means the sum total of
the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by
the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to
give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the
education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if
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Similarly, North Dakota law provides that once a
servicemember parent is called to active duty, a court may not
modify or amend "a previous judgment or order, or issue a new
order, which changes the child's placement that existed on the
date the parent was called to active duty service, except the court
may enter a temporary custody order that is in the best interest of
the child."125 "The court may issue a temporary custody order in
the best interest of the child for the time period of the active duty
service." 126 However, "[i]f an original custody decision is pending
and the service member is alerted for active duty service, or is
absent for active duty service, the court may not issue a
permanent custody order until the return of the service member
from active duty." 127
Section 9-13-110 of the Arkansas Code states that "[a] court
shall not permanently modify an order for child custody or
visitation solely on the basis that one of the parents is a mobilized
parent,"'128 and includes a list of factors that the court should
consider in determining whether to order a temporary
modification. 129 Additionally, North Carolina recently enacted a
any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other
remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this
state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining
continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent or the child
and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence
was directed against or witnessed by the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to
a particular child custody dispute.
Id.
124. Id. § 722.27.
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(9) (Supp. 2007).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-110(b) (Supp. 2007).
129. See id. § 9-13-110(c). According to the law:
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction shall determine whether a
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law that does not provide guidance for a court making a custody
determination upon a servicemember's return, but that does aim
"to provide a means by which to facilitate a fair, efficient, and
swift process to resolve matters regarding custody and visitation
when a parent receives temporary duty, deployment, or
mobilization orders from the military."130 Regarding custody, the
statute provides:
When a parent who has custody, or has joint custody with
primary physical custody, receives temporary duty,
deployment, or mobilization orders from the military that
involve moving a substantial distance from the parent's
residence or otherwise have a material effect on the parent's
ability to exercise custody responsibilities: (1) Any temporary
custody order for the child during the parent's absence shall
end no later than 10 days after the parent returns ... and (2)
The temporary duty, mobilization, or deployment and the
temporary disruption to the child's schedule shall not be a
factor in a determination of change of circumstances if a
motion is filed to transfer custody from the service member. 131
The North Carolina statute also allows a parent's visitation rights
to be delegated to another family member during the parent's
absence, 132 but it provides the general disclaimer that "[n]othing
temporary modification to an order for child custody or visitation is
appropriate for a child or children of a mobilized parent.
(2) The determination under this subsection (c) includes consideration
of any and all circumstances that are necessary to maximize the
mobilized parent's time and contact with his or her child that is
consistent with the best interest of the child, including without
limitation:
(A) The ordered length of the mobilized parent's call to active
duty;
(B) The mobilized parent's duty station or stations;
(C) The opportunity that the mobilized parent will have for
contact with the child through a leave, a pass, or other authorized
absence from duty;
(D) The contact that the mobilized parent has had with the child
before the call to active military duty;
(E) The nature of the military mission, if known; and
(F) Any other factor that the court deems appropriate under the
circumstances.
Id.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.7A(a) (West 2007).
131. Id. § 50-13.7A(c).
132. Id. § 50-13.7A(d). The statute provides:
If the parent with visitation rights receives military temporary duty,
deployment, or mobilization orders that involve moving a substantial
distance from the parent's residence or otherwise have a material
effect on the parent's ability to exercise visitation rights, the court
may delegate the parent's visitation rights, or a portion thereof, to a
family member with a close and substantial relationship to the minor
child for the duration of the parent's absence, if delegating visitation
rights is in the child's best interest.
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in this section shall alter the duty of the court to consider the best
interest of the child in deciding custody or visitation matters." 133
2. The Federal Amendment to the SCRA
On January 28, 2008, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 was signed into law by President George
W. Bush. 134 Section 584 of the Act states:
Sec. 584. Protection of Child Custody Arrangements for
Parents who are Members of the Armed Forces Deployed in
Support of a Contingency Operation.
(a) Protection of Servicemembers Against Default
Judgments.-Section 201(a) of the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. 521(a)) is amended by inserting
", including any child custody proceeding," after "proceeding".
(b) Stay of Proceedings When Servicemember Has Notice.-
Section 202(a) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50
U.S.C. App. 522(a)) is amended by inserting ", including any
child custody proceeding," after "civil action or proceeding". 135
This means that the SCRA now explicitly states that Section
521, which deals with default judgments, 136 is applicable to child
custody proceedings involving active duty servicemembers; and
that in accordance with Section 522(b), the proceeding may be
stayed.137 Although this amendment to the SCRA attempts to
ameliorate the custody problems facing servicemembers, the
SCRA remains flawed in several ways.
II. The SCRA and Child Custody Proceedings
The SCRA's purpose is "to provide for the temporary
suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and
transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of
servicemembers during their military service"1 38 in order "to
enable such persons to devote their entire energy to the defense
Id.
133. Id. § 50-13.7A(g).
134. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
135. Id. § 584.
136. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521(a) (West 2003) (amended 2008) (stating that
"[t]his section applies to any civil action or proceeding in which the defendant does
not make an appearance").
137. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522(b) (West 2004) (amended 2008); see also id. § 522(a)
(stating that the "section applies to any civil action or proceeding [where a party] at
the time of filing an application under this section-(1) is in military service or is
within 90 days after termination of or release from military service; and (2) has
received notice of the action or proceeding").
138. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 502(2) (West 2003).
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needs of the Nation." 139 Even though the SCRA provides for civil
proceedings to be stayed when certain conditions are met, state
judges often find it difficult to delay custody proceedings.140
Difficulties arise because some state judges believe that state
family law and the best interests of the child take precedence over
the protections awarded to servicemembers pursuant to the
SCRA.141 Some courts have tried to reach a compromise by
staying child custody proceedings while allowing temporary
custody decisions to be made pending trial.1 42 By doing this,
however, the Act's purposes are not being served.
A. When Courts Refuse to Stay Child Custody Proceedings,
the Purpose of the SCRA is Not Being Served
The United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he SCRA is to
be 'liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to
drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation' ' 143 and
that "the Act [SSCRA] must be read with an eye friendly"'144 to
servicemembers. Additionally, the SSCRA "is to be administered
as an instrument to accomplish substantial justice," even though
this "may result in detriment to parties who are not in the military
service." 145  The underlying rationale is that "[o]ur country's
servicemembers must have peace of mind that they will not be
subject to civil actions [for] which they cannot appear and
defend." 146
Congress enacted the SCRA in large part to protect
servicemembers who were unable to defend themselves in
litigation due to their military duties. 147 "Servicemembers in
remote or hostile locations may find it difficult to communicate
139. See id. § 502(1).
140. See, e.g., Tallon, supra note 65, at 165 (stating that "a child does not exist in
'suspended animation' during the pendency of any stay entered pursuant to the
SCRA").
141. See, e.g., Arrillaga, supra note 9; see also Tallon, supra note 65, at 165
(stating that "the issue of the child's custody during a parent's deployment must
perforce be addressed").
142. See, e.g., Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *3
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 21, 2004); Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 507 (Ark.
2004).
143. Reed v. Albaaj, 723 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Boone v.
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).
144. Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948) (citing Boone, 319 U.S. at 575).
145. In re Watson, 292 B.R. 441; 444 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (citations omitted).
146. In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
147. Id.
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with, let alone retain, legal counsel to represent them."148
Additionally, servicemembers who are preoccupied with pending
litigation are unable to fully concentrate on assignments. 149
Levi Bradley, a mechanic with the 8th Communications
Battalion, admitted that his "mind wasn't where it was supposed
to be" after a court refused to stay his child custody proceeding
while he was in Iraq. 150 Because of the time difference, Levi would
stay up until midnight so he could call his mother for updates on
his case. 151 This constant distraction proved costly when one day
Levi rolled a Humvee that he was driving. 15 2 Luckily, Levi was
not injured. 153 It is incidents like this that have caused military
commanders to grow increasingly concerned about the distractions
that result from an ongoing child custody proceeding. 154
Even though the SCRA is designed to protect servicemembers
and allow them to devote their full attention to their military
duties, some active duty servicemembers have been forced to rush
home from deployment because judges refuse to stay child custody
proceedings. 155 This has caused military commanders to worry
that "the court hearings could endanger battlefield readiness."
15 6
In attempting to justify this defiance of the SCRA, family court
judges often argue that because a child does not exist in
"suspended animation," the best interests of the child cannot
support staying child custody proceedings.1 57 Judges have also
argued that the effects of a stay would allow servicemembers to
unilaterally modify custody orders, and would therefore violate the
non-servicemember parent's constitutional right "to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." 158
148. Cohen, supra note 12, at 332.






155. See Associated Press, Custody Hearing Goes on Despite Deployment, May
29, 2007, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/05/ap-custodyhearing-070529/.
156. Id.
157. See e.g., Tallon, supra note 65, at 165 (concluding that "pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the stay provision of the
SCRA necessarily applies to custody cases," but since "a child does not exist in
'suspended animation' during the pendency of any stay entered pursuant to the
SCRA[, t]he issue of the child's custody during a parent's deployment must perforce
be addressed').
158. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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These arguments, however, ignore the fact that the SCRA
must be administered to provide servicemembers "peace of mind
that they will not be subject to civil actions [for] which they cannot
appear and defend"'159 themselves, even though this "may result in
detriment to parties who are not in the military service." 160 This
means that even though staying a custody proceeding may be
detrimental to the non-deployed parent, a stay pursuant to the
SCRA should still be granted, assuming that the conditions for
granting a stay have been met. The SCRA's purpose is to enable
servicemembers to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs
of the nation,"161 and when courts refuse to stay custody
proceedings, this purpose is not achieved. Levi's Humvee accident
is just one example of the potential consequences. Additionally,
the SCRA is intended to protect servicemembers from some of the
adverse legal effects of military service,162 and when temporary
custody orders issued during a servicemember's absence are
allowed to become permanent upon the servicemember's return,
the SCRA's purposes are not being served.
B. The Conflict Between Staying Proceedings Pursuant to
the SCRA and Child Custody Proceedings as Seen
Through Case Law
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the SCRA does
"not prevent the circuit court from entering a temporary order of
custody." 63  The court reasoned that if it stayed the custody
proceeding and refused to grant a temporary custody order, the
child would be left where he was when the stay was granted,
which would "provide servicemembers an advantage rather than
protect[ing them] against adverse affects."164 The court also
acknowledged, however, that the Act's purpose was "to relieve
servicemembers from disadvantages arising from military
service."' 65 But, awarding an ex-spouse temporary custody of a
child does not relieve the servicemember "from disadvantages
arising from military service,"' 66 when there would have been no
change in custody, even temporarily, if the custodial parent was
159. In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
160. In re Watson, 292 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (citations omitted).
161. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 502(1) (West 2003); see id. § 502.
162. See Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 511 (Ark. 2004).
163. Id. at 507.
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not a member of the military.
In Tallon v. DaSilva, the court held that parents may not
"use powers of attorney to assign custody rights to grandparents or
others while deployed outside the Commonwealth on active
military service."167 However, in Troxel v. Granville, the United
States Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children."168 The Court's decision in Troxel did not hold that only
non-deployed parents have a fundamental right "to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children," 169 but
that all parents have that right. This means that when a court
grants a temporary custody order that modifies the custodial
arrangement established by the servicemember parent prior to
deployment, the court is violating the servicemember parent's
fundamental right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children." 170  Although the Tallon court
favored the rights of the non-deployed parent, the SCRA is
intended both to protect and to provide substantial justice for
active duty servicemembers, even if it "may result in detriment to
parties who are not in the military service." 171
Courts have erroneously claimed that a temporary custody
award does not materially affect servicemembers' ability to defend
themselves at later custody hearings. 172 The Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals "fail[ed] to see how the juvenile court's refusal to
stay a pendente lite custody order could materially affect the
mother's ability to defend her interests at a final custody hearing
after she returns from active duty," and as a result affirmed the
lower court's denial of the stay. 173
These courts, however, ignore the fact that "[t]he soldier is at
a disadvantage in a custody suit brought before the court either
during or after deployment, because the other parent has often
gained an advantage by being the custodial parent during the
deployment."'174 As a result of this disadvantage, soldiers who are
167. Tallon, supra note 65, at 165; see supra notes 68-69.
168. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. In re Watson, 292 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (citations omitted).
172. See, e.g., Exparte K.N.L., 872 So.2d 868 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
173. Id. at 871-72.
174. Darrell Baughn, Divorce & Deployment: Representing the Military
Servicemember, 28 FAM. ADVOC. 8, 12 (2005).
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fighting for our nation can lose custody of their children. 175 In In
re Marriage of Grantham, the Iowa Supreme Court held that it
would not serve the best interests of the children to ignore matters
that occurred during the father's military service "if those matters
weigh in favor of a change of child custody."'176 Accordingly, the
court awarded the non-deployed parent permanent physical
custody of the children because it concluded that the children's
"situation ha[d] improved substantially since their placement with
their mother pursuant to the court's temporary order."'177 In In re
Marriage of Bradley, a Kansas trial judge said that he "didn't
believe [the case] was subject to the federal law because 'this
Court has a continuing obligation to consider what's in the best
interest of the child."' 78  Consequently, the judge awarded
temporary physical custody of the child to Levi's ex-wife, and
shortly thereafter "that order was made permanent."' 79  As a
result, Levi gets to see his son for four days at a time when he is
able to get to Kansas on leave. 180
III. An Examination of Legislative Attempts to Resolve
the Conflict Between the SCRA and Child Custody
Proceedings
Prior to the recent amendment to the SCRA, which
specifically states that the Act applies to child custody
proceedings,' 8 courts often decided that state family law trumped
the SCRA.182 However, even when finding that the SCRA applied
175. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2005).
176. Id. at 144-45.
177. Id. at 146. But see In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 03-2100, 2004 WL
2579567, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004), vacated, 698 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa
2005). The court stated:
All of these assertions occurred after the district court granted Tammara
temporary physical care of the children and would not have occurred but
for this change in placement. Thus, reliance on them would only further
prejudice Michael by exacerbating the statutory and due process violations
accompanying the denial of his request for a stay of the proceedings and
the resulting temporary care order.
Id.
178. Arrillaga, supra note 9, at A8 (quoting In re Marriage of Bradley, 137 P.3d
1030, 1032 (Kan. 2006)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522 (West 2008) ("This section applies to any civil action
or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding .... ").
182. See, e.g., Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 511 (Ark. 2004) (stating that
since children do not live in "suspended animation . . . the court properly
entertained the issue of ... temporary custody"); Diffin v. Towne, No. V-00560-
04/04A, 2004 WL 1218792, at *3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 21, 2004) (stating that "even
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to child custody proceedings, courts found it difficult to balance the
best interests of the child with the parent's right to stay a
proceeding under the SCRA.183 Cognizant of this issue, state
legislatures have recently begun enacting statutes that provide
guidance to courts in balancing these issues and that establish a
legal framework for how these complex issues should be handled.
A. Current State Responses
Although there is slight variation among the states, the
majority of recently enacted state statutes provide for a
reinstatement of the most recent custody order that existed prior
to the servicemember parent's deployment, unless, in the
discretion of the court, it is in the best interests of the child for the
temporary order to be made permanent.18 4 Additionally, many
state statutes specify that, in most circumstances, the only relief a
court can grant in a custody proceeding involving an active duty
servicemember is an order for temporary custody.18 5  Some
statutes also deal with the servicemember parent's absence due to
military service and how that should affect a best interests of the
child determination. 186
In Michigan, the law states that "[i]f a motion for change of
custody is filed after a parent returns from active military duty,
the court shall not consider a parent's absence due to that military
duty in a best interest of the child determination."18 7 But what
in instances where a stay is granted, the Courts have the power to award
temporary relief to the non-moving party" in family situations).
183. See, e.g., Lenser, 191 S.W.3d at 511 (determining that "support, custody,
and other similar matters" can be considered by the court despite a stay).
184. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.7A(c)(1) (2007) ("Any temporary
custody order for the child during the parent's absence shall end no later than 10
days after the parent returns .... ); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06(9) (Supp. 2007)
("The temporary custody order must explicitly provide that custody must be
restored to the service member upon the service member's release from active duty
service ... ").
185. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-110(c)(1) (2007) ("A court . . . shall
determine whether a temporary modification to an order for custody order or
visitation is appropriate for [the] child .... ); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.7A(c)(1)
(2007) (stating that a court may enter a temporary custody order); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-06.6(9) (Supp. 2007) (stating that the court may only "enter a temporary
custody order that is in the best interest of the child").
186. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 Sec. 7(1)(c) (West Supp. 2008)
('The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or order or issue a
new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless
there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
child."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(9) (Supp. 2007) (stating that if a parent is on
active duty status, a court may only "enter a temporary order that is in the best
interest of the child").
187. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 Sec. 7(1)(c) (West Supp. 2008).
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does it mean to "not consider a parent's absence?"1 8 If it means
that a court should only consider the child's situation before the
servicemember parent was on active duty, this would ignore what
is in the child's best interests at the time the court is determining
custody. If the law means that the servicemember parent's
absence and lack of active involvement in the child's life during
that time will be ignored, then it does not change the fact that a
temporary custody order can become permanent because the best
interests determination favors the most recent custodial parent. It
is necessary for the meaning of this language to be clarified before
the law's effectiveness can be ascertained.
The law in North Dakota is similar to the Michigan law in
most respects, but it also tries to confront a critical aspect of the
problem facing judges when a parent is on active duty during a
divorce proceeding. The North Dakota law states that "[i]f an
original custody decision is pending and the service member is
alerted for active duty service, or is absent for active duty service,
the court may not issue a permanent custody order until the
return of the service member from active duty."18 9 Thus, at a
minimum, this law clearly states that judges are not to issue
permanent custody orders when a parent is absent due to active
military service. 190
The Arkansas law is slightly different, in that it states "[a]
court shall not permanently modify an order for child custody or
visitation solely on the basis that one (1) of the parents is a
mobilized parent."191  The Arkansas Legislature intended to
prevent courts from issuing a permanent custody order when the
only change in circumstances had been a servicemember parent's
mobilization. 192 This law, however, does not address whether it
would be permissible for a court to permanently modify a custody
order if, in addition to the parent's mobilization, another factor
exists that is only minor and itself inadequate to justify a change
in custody. This may mean that the additional factor could be
combined with the servicemember parent's absence as a basis for
changing custody. Additionally, the other factor allowing a court
to permanently modify a custody order may be a factor that only
arose as a result of the servicemember parent's mobilization. Once
these issues are addressed, section 9-13-110 of the Arkansas Code
188. Id.
189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(9) (Supp. 2007).
190. See id.
191. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-110(b) (2007).
192. See id.
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may resolve some of the problems that servicemember parents
confront when they are called to active duty to protect our nation's
interests at home and abroad.
North Carolina recently enacted a law that states: "The
temporary duty, mobilization, or deployment and the temporary
disruption to the child's schedule shall not be a factor in a
determination of change of circumstances if a motion is filed to
transfer custody from the service member." 193 Like the Arkansas
law, the North Carolina law fails to address whether the effects of
this temporary mobilization may be considered as "a factor in a
determination of change of circumstances if a motion is filed to
transfer custody from the service member." 194  This omission is
important because if the mobilization's effects may be considered
as a factor in a determination of change of circumstances, then
this law, in effect, does nothing to change the current problems
that servicemember parents face. This problem arises because, if
a deployed servicemember parent delegates his or her custodial
rights to a non-parental relative, this change of custody, which
only arose as a result of the servicemember's mobilization, could
be used in support of a finding of a change in circumstances.
However, if the mobilization's effects may not be considered in a
change of circumstances determination, then it is possible that the
natural parent's rights could be subordinated to those of a third
party. Additionally, the North Carolina law provides a general
disclaimer that "[n]othing in this section shall alter the duty of the
court to consider the best interest of the child in deciding custody
or visitation matters."1 95 Consequently, this law still favors the
temporary custodian because most of the best interest
considerations favor the parent who most recently had custody of
the child. 196 That said, the North Carolina law is still
commendable because it allows a court to delegate a
servicemember parent's visitation rights to another family
member if the parent's military service prevents him or her from
exercising his or her visitation rights and such a delegation would
be in the best interests of the child. 197 This provision is important
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.7A(c)(2) (2007).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 50-13.7A(g).
196. See Arrillaga, supra note 9, at A8.
197. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.7A(d) (stating that "[i]f the parent with
visitation rights receives [orders that prevent that parent from exercising]
visitation rights, the court may delegate the parent's visitation rights, or a portion
thereof, to a family member with a close and substantial relationship to the minor
child for the duration of the parent's absence," if it is in the child's best interests).
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because it allows a servicemember parent to still feel as if he or
she has some involvement in the child's life, even if he or she
cannot be personally involved.
B. The Federal Amendment to the SCRA
Although several states have enacted laws that address the
problems posed by the current version of the SCRA and its
application to child custody proceedings, Congress recognized that
a national solution was needed. As a result, Congress recently
amended the SCRA so that it explicitly states that the default
judgment and stay provisions of the Act are applicable in child
custody proceedings involving active duty servicemembers. 198
This new federal amendment, however, fails to address the issue
of whether the SCRA preempts state family law in child custody
proceedings. Additionally, the new federal amendment does not
adequately address how courts should resolve the conflict between
a temporary custody order and any resulting best interests of the
child determination. For these reasons, Congress should enact
legislation that explicitly deals with the problem of staying child
custody actions pursuant to the SCRA, state courts across the
nation are facing.
IV. A Proposal for a New Federal Law that Amends the
SCRA and Takes into Account Both the Best Interests
of the Child and the Rights of Servicemembers
As discussed previously, several states have enacted laws
attempting to address the conflict between the best interests of the
child and the staying of a child custody proceeding pursuant to the
SCRA.199 Congress has only recently enacted an amendment to
the SCRA that directly deals with child custody proceedings, 200
but this amendment still fails to address several problems. Thus,
a new federal law should be enacted that balances the competing
interests of minor children and servicemember parents.
The main reason why a federal law addressing these issues
should be enacted is because servicemembers are being treated
differently depending on their state of residence. 20 This is true
even though they are often deployed, on behalf of this country, to
engage in combat in a foreign country or to assist in a federal
198. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, § 584, 122 Stat. 3, 128.
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 522 (West 2008).
201. See supra Part III.
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disaster. This difference in treatment often is a result of differing
interpretations among state courts of the applicability and
meaning of a federal law, the SCRA. 20 2 Because servicemembers
are not serving individual states, but the country as a whole, they
should not be treated differently in the legal system with respect
to issues that arise in connection with their military service.
Additionally, if Congress had not felt this problem was necessary
to address and had only wanted to afford servicemembers some
general sort of protection, then Congress could have simply
required each state to enact its own legislation to protect active
servicemembers.
To be effective, any amendment to the SCRA must explicitly
state that the Act applies to child custody proceedings, and that it
preempts state law. This language is necessary to ensure that all
servicemembers are treated uniformly regardless of their state of
residence. Additionally, this amendment must recognize that, due
to changed circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child
is not always compatible with the previous custody order.
The goal of this federal law, however, should be to prevent
any foreseeable litigation involving the child of a servicemember
during that parent's military service. Accordingly, the law should
mandate that when a servicemember parent is enlisted, but not on
active duty, at the time of a divorce or the issuing of an initial
custody order, the initial custody order must specify who will have
custody of the child if the servicemember parent is deployed.
Additionally, to prevent custody disputes from arising after a
servicemember parent has been deployed, the SCRA must be
amended to require that all servicemember parents make a good
faith effort, before deployment, to notify any other person who
would currently have standing to petition the court for an order
modifying custody that the servicemember parent is being
deployed. Once contacted, those individuals would have a
specified period of time to notify the servicemember and the court
if they plan to petition for a modification of custody; and if notice is
not given within that time, those individuals would waive their
right to petition the court for a modification of custody while the
servicemember is on active duty. However, if an individual who
has standing to petition the court for custody is not notified of the
servicemember parent's absence until after deployment, then
temporary custody may be granted to that individual if the court
believes it is in the child's best interests. This notice requirement
202. Compare Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506 (Ark. 2004) with In re
Marriage of Bradley, 137 P.3d 1030, 1032 (Kan. 2006).
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would provide a servicemember parent with an incentive to tell
the non-servicemember parent, and any other individuals who
may have standing to petition the court for custody, about their
deployment, since a failure to do so could result in a temporary
custody order being issued while the servicemember parent is
deployed.
Another possible amendment would require courts to uphold
custodial designations made pursuant to a Military Family Plan or
a power of attorney, if those documents have been signed by the
non-deployed parent. This requirement would promote
communication between the parents and would resolve custodial
conflicts prior to a servicemember's deployment. In situations
where the servicemember parent agrees to give the non-deployed
parent custody during his or her absence, or in situations where
both parents agree on whom the temporary custodian should be,
this would not be a difficult task to accomplish.
Finally, the SCRA should be amended to require that unless
consented to, any delegation of custodial rights by a
servicemember parent must not interfere with the non-deployed
parent's custodial or visitation rights. A federal amendment to the
SCRA based on the aforementioned considerations would allow
state judges to better accommodate the competing interests of
servicemember parents, non-deployed parents, and the best
interests of the child.
Conclusion
According to Congress, the SCRA is intended to protect
servicemembers from the adverse legal effects of military
service, 203 in order "to enable such persons to devote their entire
energy to the defense needs of the Nation."204 The purpose of the
SCRA is not being served, however, when temporary custody
orders issued during a servicemember's absence are allowed to
become permanent upon the servicemember's return. Accordingly,
in order for the SCRA to effectively protect the legal rights of all
individuals serving in the armed forces, including those with
children, the SCRA must be amended. Otherwise, servicemember
parents will continue to lose custody of their children simply
because they answered our nation's call to duty.
203. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 502(2) (West 2003).
204. See id. § 502(1).
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